Religious Evidentialism by Dormandy, Katherine
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIlosoPHY oF relIGIoN 5/2 (summer 2013), PP. 63-86
RELIGIOUS EVIDENTIALISM
KATHERINE DORMANDY (NÉE MUNN)
Munich School of Philosophy
Abstract. should religious believers proportion their religious beliefs to their 
evidence? They should: religious faith is better, ceteris paribus, when the beliefs 
accompanying it are evidence-proportioned. I offer two philosophical arguments 
and a biblical argument. The philosophical arguments conclude that love and trust, 
two attitudes belonging to faith, are better, ceteris paribus, when accompanied by 
evidence-proportioned belief, and that so too is the faith in question. The biblical 
argument concludes that beliefs associated with faith, portrayed in the Hebrew 
bible and the New Testament, are typically, and normatively, exhorted on the 
basis of evidence. I hope to convince religious believers and nonbelievers alike 
that religious beliefs should be evidence-proportioned.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
Is religious belief epistemically acceptable? This question is important: 
beliefs that are not should not be held, and many people hold religious 
beliefs. There is disagreement over what makes beliefs epistemically 
acceptable. A  common way to cash it out is as belief proportioned to 
evidence.
I shall argue for
Religious Evidentialism: one’s religious beliefs ought to be proportioned 
to one’s evidence.
religious evidentialism is a specific application of the more general claim
Evidentialism: one’s beliefs ought to be proportioned to one’s evidence.
evidentialism is often formulated as a theory of epistemic justification, 
recently by Conee and Feldman (2004), although historically it was 
understood as pertaining to epistemic ‘oughts’.1 I employ epistemic ‘ought’ 
1 locke 1690; Clifford 1877.
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claims, which I’ll clarify as needed. I’ll argue for the more restricted 
religious evidentialism.
Why deny religious evidentialism? some might think it is right to 
hold religious beliefs regardless of the strength of one’s evidence: the 
normativity of faith overrides the normativity of evidence.2 This might 
be because one thinks that strongly held religious beliefs are more likely 
to lead to salvation than weakly held ones, to say nothing of the effect on 
salvation of not holding such beliefs at all. or it might be because one 
thinks that seeking evidence for religious beliefs, let alone holding them 
hostage to it, disrespects God: we show him great trust by believing more 
strongly than our evidence warrants. or one might side with the ‘new 
atheists’ in thinking that religious belief simply does not stand up to one’s 
evidence at all, yet still take belief to be better than unbelief.3
my arguments for religious evidentialism will debunk such 
views. It makes for better faith to have religious beliefs which are 
evidence-proportioned.
II. relIGIous eVIDeNTIAlIsm
This section clarifies some terms of discussion.
Religious beliefs pertain to religious matters. I won’t offer a definition 
of religious matters but take it that these can be grouped in the same 
loose yet recognizable way as, say, culinary matters. We may understand 
religious faith as the cultivation of relationship with God. I am thinking 
of God as conceived of in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but I hope this 
paper will interest adherents of other traditions.
Ought. What kind of normativity is at issue in religious evidentialism? 
I am not thinking of it is as epistemic (though I endorse evidentialism 
more broadly as an epistemic norm) or ethical (though I think that, given 
God’s existence, religious evidentialism is likely to be a moral norm). 
I have in mind a sort of normativity originating in the natures of things, 
which I’ll call ‘kind normativity’. let’s suppose that there are natural 
kinds, such as water.4 let’s suppose too that some natural kinds can have 
2 e.g. Kierkegaard 1843.
3 one might also worry that religious propositions, pertaining to a  transcendent 
reality, are not the kind of thing which human beings can have evidence for; I  won’t 
address this concern here.
4 I  am committed to few if any views about what natural kinds are, though an 
essentialist view along the lines of Kripke 1980 is attractive; see mellor 1977 for criticism.
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better or worse instantiations, and that there can even be borderline 
cases where it is unclear whether a thing instantiates the relevant kind at 
all. Water is one such kind: whether a sample qualifies as water, and its 
goodness as a sample, depends on how many other substances it contains. 
Pure H2o is an ideal seldom found outside of scientific labs, but (let’s 
assume) it sets the bar for a ‘kind normativity’ governing all instances of 
water.5 We may similarly think of religious faith as a natural kind which 
can have better or worse instantiations. It is sometimes unclear whether 
a person’s attitude counts as faith at all. religious evidentialism says that 
one feature which makes for ideal religious faith (though not the only 
one) is that the agent’s religious beliefs be evidence-proportioned.
‘Ought’ and ‘can’. How can religious evidentialism be true if doxastic 
attitudes are involuntary – doesn’t ‘ought’ imply ‘can’? It seems odd to 
make requirements which agents are not in complete control of meeting. 
my response is that not all ‘oughts’ do imply ‘can’, including ‘oughts’ about 
belief formation. even without voluntary control over their beliefs, agents 
can do their best to attend to their evidence, to cultivate dispositions to 
respond virtuously to evidence, and so forth. religious evidentialism is 
analogous to the moral rule ‘one ought always to do what is right’, which 
we are bound by even when we aren’t presently able to do what is right 
(say, because we don’t know what that is). These are not rules which we 
can always be faulted for falling short of (though often we can), but from 
this it does not follow that they do not apply to us.6
An agent’s evidence is any legitimate reason for belief. one condition 
on evidence is that it must have representational content. The reason is, 
the beliefs supported by evidence are themselves representations. only 
something which presents things as being some way can legitimately 
affect one’s views about how things are. let’s call a  vehicle for such 
representational content a  proposition. Propositions can convey all 
manner of representational content, even the content of mystical or 
otherwise inarticulable experiences. To see this, note that sentences which 
refer deictically to such experiences, as in (e.g.), ‘I had that experience’, 
express propositions.7 Deictically expressed propositions are not, of 
course, informative for a listener who has not had the experience pointed 
5 This is a simplifying assumption for the sake of illustration; see Needham 2003 for 
discussion.
6 see Williamson 2000.
7 brewer 1999; Williamson 2000.
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to by the proposition. but this is not a problem: one person’s evidence 
need not be communicable to others to be a legitimate reason for belief.
There are two ways for a  proposition to be evidence for an agent: 
when she has a  doxastic attitude towards it, and when she does not. 
If she has such an attitude, then that attitude must be belief (a second 
condition on evidence).8 If she disbelieves The moon is made of cheese, 
then she should not fashion her representation of reality around it.9 
on the second way for a proposition to be evidence for an agent, she 
merely entertains it without having a doxastic attitude towards it. In this 
case, that proposition, in order to be evidence for her, must have been 
presented to her by a representational experience (the final condition on 
evidence). An experience as of a chocolate fountain presents the agent 
with the proposition There is chocolate fountain, which provides her with 
evidence about many propositions, such as There is chocolate nearby, If 
I have money I will be enjoying myself soon, as well as There is a chocolate 
fountain itself.10 by contrast, a proposition which spontaneously enters 
the agent’s mind, say, because she has eaten too much chocolate, is not 
evidence for her. To summarize, evidence is any proposition which the 
agent believes or which is presented to her by a representational experience.11
Proportioning. An agent proportions her belief to her evidence 
when that belief is an epistemically legitimate response to her evidence. 
8 since beliefs can be more or less confidently held (see below), the level of confidence 
an agent has in an evidential proposition will affect what beliefs this proposition supports 
for her. I’ll ignore this feature of the account here.
9 If she believes its negation of course then the latter is evidence for her.
10 Thus a  proposition p may sometimes be evidence for itself. but this result is 
harmless, not least because it is limited by the constraint that beliefs must be evidence-
proportioned. First, an agent cannot use p as evidence about whether p unless an 
experience presents her with p. No belief that p can ‘bootstrap’ on another belief that p. 
second, that a proposition may provide evidence for itself in such limited circumstances 
does not entail that that proposition is ‘self-evident’, even in those circumstances. self- 
evidence implies indefeasibility, whereas a proposition presented by an experience can 
merely provide defeasible evidence for itself. If an experience presents me with The cat 
is speaking Russian, yet I am aware that I have been given lsD, any belief in The cat is 
speaking Russian is undermined.
11 Williamson 2000 and Goldman 2009 construe evidence more strongly: for them 
the agent must have an epistemically privileged doxastic attitude towards their evidence 
(knowledge or justified belief). my account of evidence is more like that of Jeffrey 2004 in 
taking experiential content to be evidence too, with few if any restrictions on the agent’s 
attitude towards that content. It also resembles Conee and Feldman’s 2004 account, except 
that they take experiences and beliefs themselves, rather than propositions, as evidence.
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I assume that beliefs can be held more or less confidently, and that the 
confidence with which a proposition should be believed correlates with 
the strength of the agent’s evidence. Weak evidence might not merit 
belief in a proposition p at all, but rather suspension of judgement from 
p or disbelief in it.
I don’t assume that the evidential support relation is objective (i.e., 
that, for some total body of evidence e and some proposition p, there 
is a  correct epistemic attitude to have towards p on the basis of e). 
For all I am committed to, the support at issue might be community-
relative. That said, the examples from my biblical argument for religious 
evidentialism do seem to assume an objective evidential support 
relation, although my case from the bible does not rely on this feature of 
the biblical account.
I’ll now argue for religious evidentialism. The first two arguments, 
from the nature of faith, are philosophical; the third, in the spirit of the 
present symposium on tradition-centric reasons for religious belief, 
originate (I argue) in Judeo-Christian scripture. my arguments will thus 
give secularists and religious believers alike cause to endorse religious 
evidentialism. In addition, the biblical argument should interest 
those secularists who want to convince religious believers of religious 
evidentialism on premises which the latter should accept.
III. TWo PHIlosoPHICAl ArGumeNTs: loVe AND TrusT
one important element of religious faith, perhaps definitive of faith, is 
cultivating relationship with God.12 Cultivating relationship with any 
person, human or divine, requires knowing her. one major way to come 
to know a  person is to believe truths about her. of course, personal 
knowledge, to say nothing of relationship, requires more than this; 
nonetheless true belief is important.
The canonical way to acquire true beliefs about persons, as about 
anything, is to acquire evidence, whether from the world or from 
introspective reasoning,13 and to proportion one’s beliefs to it. I’ll argue 
that relationship – with any person, including God – is ceteris paribus 
excellent, in the sense of kind-normativity introduced above, to the extent 
12 specifically, it is cultivating a good relationship with God.
13 It is a conceit to think that evidence-providing representational experiences must 
be empirical. Counterexamples include deduction, experiences of ‘turning evidence 
over’ in one’s mind, introspective experiences resulting in self-knowledge, etc.
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that one’s beliefs about the other person are evidence-proportioned: 
evidence-proportioned belief is an ideal-making feature of relationship. 
since at least a large part of faith includes the cultivation of relationship 
with God, any given person’s faith is excellent (at least in one important 
way) when the beliefs associated with it are evidence-proportioned.
many things make relationship good, but I’ll focus on love and trust. 
let’s assume that relationships are better to the extent that these attitudes 
are present. but what do love and trust have to do with evidence? both 
are often accompanied by beliefs, in particular about whether the other 
person is loveworthy or trustworthy. It is these beliefs which I’ll argue 
should be evidence-proportioned in order to make love and trust, and 
thus the relationship with the loved and trusted person, the best they can 
be. since faith constitutively involves cultivating relationship with God, 
a fortiori the faithful person’s beliefs about God should be proportioned 
to her evidence.
An Argument from Love
let’s assume that there are such properties as loveworthiness and 
unloveworthiness, determined by more basic properties. To the extent 
that something has the basic properties, that thing is loveworthy or 
unloveworthy.14 If Hermia has a  loveworthy feature F, then lysander, 
who loves her, believes that she has F, recognizes that F is loveworthy, 
and delights in Hermia’s having F.15 suppose Hermia is kind. lysander 
delights in kindness, which is loveworthy per se, but finds a  twofold 
delight in Hermia’s kindness: it is loveworthy and it is hers. Delight in 
the loveworthy properties of one’s beloved is one thing that makes for 
excellent love.
love, however, neither is nor should be restricted to loveworthy 
things.16 It is often excellent when directed towards unloveworthy things. 
The difference is, a lover does not delight in her beloved’s unloveworthy 
14 These properties might differ between types of object, and some properties may 
make for love- or unloveworthiness for the lover just because she values them.
15 Psychological factors, from which I am abstracting, complicate this and any feature 
of love, of course. For one, some agents might not delight in some objectively loveworthy 
properties.
16 I thus part ways with those who define love in terms of responding to the beloved’s 
loveworthy aspects (e.g. Vlastos 1981, on Plato; Velleman 2008). Nor is my view 
committed to any special account of reasons-responsiveness (such as Jollimore’s 2011). 
I say nothing about what if anything makes love reasonable; I argue only that the beliefs 
associated with it should be.
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features, but loves him in spite of them, where you love x in spite of 
a property F only if you love x and x’s having F causes you grief. Although 
F is grievous in itself, you take twofold grief: in F’s being exemplified 
and in your beloved’s exemplifying it. loving someone in spite of her 
unloveworthy features also makes for excellent love, because it enables 
you to show her grace and gives her the opportunity to accept it.
I’ll argue that love is better when the lover’s beliefs about the beloved’s 
loveworthiness are proportioned to the lover’s evidence than when they 
are not. but what does love have to do with evidence?
suppose oberon casts a  spell which makes lysander believe that 
Hermia, whom he hardly knows, is kind (a loveworthy trait) and lazy (an 
unloveworthy one). These beliefs happen to be true, but lysander has no 
evidence that they are (and is unaware of the spell). Yet he finds himself 
loving Hermia, delighting in her alleged kindness and directing grace 
her way in spite of her alleged laziness. What should Hermia make of 
lysander’s love when he declares it to her? Not much. For all that lysander 
has reason to think, Hermia might not be kind at all. Proclaiming delight 
in her kindness here is like proclaiming delight in her beauty without 
ever having seen her. For Hermia this should seem like empty flattery at 
best. she shouldn’t take lysander seriously, for it seems impossible that it 
is even her kindness which engenders his delight. The same goes for the 
grace lysander shows Hermia for her alleged laziness; she happens to be 
lazy but he has no evidence that she is. In particular lysander has never 
himself been inconvenienced by her laziness. but surely grace is most 
potent when responding to particular manifestations of unloveworthy 
properties, above all towards the gracious lover. Here Hermia, although 
she is lazy (and knows it), is entitled to feel misunderstood because of an 
unfounded assumption lysander makes about her: she may be lazy, but 
has certainly given lysander no reason to think so. Imagine lysander’s 
being gracious about Hermia’s warts when he has no evidence that she 
has any.
And what should lysander make of this love which motivates him to 
delight in and show grace to someone he barely knows for features he has 
no evidence that she has? He should worry. He should be disconcerted 
at finding himself with completely unwarranted beliefs. but more to the 
point, love, perhaps more than other attitudes, makes one vulnerable 
to self-deception. In love it is too easy to believe more or less strongly 
than one’s evidence warrants. To the extent that one self-deceives about 
one’s beloved, it is arguable that it is not even her whom one loves, but 
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a  fantasy of one’s own engineering. self-deceptive love, if love at all, 
is surely inferior to love in which one’s beliefs about one’s beloved are 
evidence-proportioned. evidence is a  safeguard against self-deception 
and thus facilitates honest love, for delighting and grace-showing alike.
The above remarks about love hold for God’s love, which provides 
the perfect model for ours. God delights in the loveworthy features of 
his creation (‘God saw that it was good’17), humanity most of all (‘very 
good’18), and his love is undiminished by its unloveworthy ones, as his 
grief and grace on account of them testify.19 one might object that I have 
argued that love’s excellence is indexed to the lover’s evidence about the 
beloved, whereas an omniscient God needs no evidence. This remark 
is true, but not a problem for my account. It merely observes that God 
has evidence trivially, indeed infinite amounts of it.20 moreover, this is 
just what makes his love perfect: every loveworthy and unloveworthy 
property alike, accompanied by every reason for belief about them, is on 
stark display to his omniscience, and he loves just the same.
Love and Faith
If God’s love for human beings is excellent because fully informed, 
I  don’t see why human love for God should be any different. If God 
really is loveworthy, we do him a  disservice by claiming to delight in 
his loveworthiness without evidence-proportioned belief that he is 
loveworthy, and we do ourselves one by missing out on cause for delight. 
If he is not loveworthy, then our love risks being empty or idolatrous. love 
of God without evidence-proportioned belief about his loveworthiness is 
little more than ungrounded flattery and possibly self-deception.
What about grace? one might think that there is a place for showing 
God grace for unloveworthiness, for example in the face of suffering 
he allows. but this suggestion yields contradiction: being perfectly 
loveworthy, God cannot be at all unloveworthy. so grace towards God 
on account of his unloveworthiness is incoherent. but from this it does not 
follow that all grace towards him is misplaced: if he allows suffering, he 
17 Genesis 1:10.
18 Genesis 1:31.
19 Christians have the example of love among members of the Trinity, who delight 
maximally because of their maximum loveworthiness, and grieve maximally when the 
son assumes sinners’ unloveworthiness.
20 I  don’t assume that God knows via perception. His evidence might be entirely 
introspective.
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can surely be shown grace even if his doing so is not unloveworthy per 
se. but perhaps talk of grace towards God has more to do with trust than 
with love. so let’s move on.
I have argued that love with evidence-proportioned belief about one’s 
beloved is better, ceteris paribus, than love without it.21 For the sake of 
having the most excellent love of God that one can, one’s beliefs about his 
loveworthiness should be evidence-proportioned.
An Argument from Trust
I’ll make a similar case about trust, another aspect of relationship with 
God. I’ll argue that trust is better, ceteris paribus, in the sense of kind-
based normativity introduced above, to the extent that one’s beliefs about 
the trusted person are evidence-proportioned.
Trust is a  three-place relation: A  person trusts another person for 
something.22 Discussion of the nature of trust centres around its three 
core aspects: the belief that someone can be trusted for something, the 
act of trusting him for that thing, and the emotion of trusting. I don’t 
reduce trust to any single element;23 I’ll just be clear which one I’m 
talking about. These elements of trust can come apart: I can perform the 
action of trusting you to water my plants – by giving you instructions 
and housekeys – even if I don’t believe that you’ll come through. I can 
believe that you are trustworthy, but not feel trusting of you. And even 
if I feel trusting of you, I may decide not to entrust my plants to you. I’ll 
argue that the act of trusting someone is excellent to the extent that belief 
in her trustworthiness is evidence-proportioned (and that evidence may 
come in part from emotions of trusting).
How does each element of trust relate to evidence? The belief, as I’ll 
argue, should be evidence-proportioned.
The emotion of trust can provide evidence about trustworthiness. 
emotions can include representational experiences: I  feel as if you are 
sad, as if she is trustworthy. The evidence provided by such experiences is 
of course defeasible, but so is most evidence. To motivate the suggestion 
that emotions can provide evidence, note that they can be caused by 
things of which we are unconscious. one candidate explanation, say, for 
21 For more arguments for this conclusion, see my ‘should love ever be blind?’ 
(under review).
22 I’ll restrict the discussion to trust of persons.
23 see Hardin 2002 for a reductionist view; for a pluralistic one see simpson 2012.
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your feeling distrustful towards me is that something about me sets off 
alarm bells below your conscious awareness.
As for the action: Trusting, like any action, can be instrumentally 
rational, a way to achieve some goal. I have many goals, some conflicting. 
one is to have flourishing plants, another is to finish this article before 
my holiday. I might value one goal more than another: my plants might 
be like my surrogate children, whereas the article deadline is soft. 
Conversely, I might regard my plants as fungible decorations, whereas 
making the deadline is necessary for inclusion in a valuable publication. 
Whether I  should trust my neighbour, Grim reaper, with my plants 
depends on how these goals weigh up – and on my evidence about Grim’s 
trustworthiness. say the evidence warrants a mediocre confidence that he 
is trustworthy. Whether this suffices for me to act in trust and surrender 
my housekeys depends on how much I value appearing in the publication 
versus having my plants survive. The more highly one values the object 
for which one is considering whether to trust, the better evidence one 
should have, ceteris paribus, that the potential trustee is trustworthy.
There are two exceptions. one arises when it is instrumentally rational 
not to act in trust in spite of having very high evidence-proportioned 
confidence that the person is trustworthy. You might value other goals 
more highly than obtaining that thing, or there might be a surer way to 
obtain it than by trusting. The other exception is more relevant here: 
cases where it may be instrumentally rational to trust someone in spite 
of having low evidence-proportioned confidence that he is trustworthy.
some define trust partly in terms of imperfect confidence about 
whether the trustee will come through. swinburne claims that to trust 
someone is ‘to act on the assumption that [she] will do for you what 
[she] knows you want or need, when the evidence gives some reason 
for supposing that she may not’ (2005: 143). on his view, I don’t count 
as trusting Grim for my plants unless the evidence indicates that he 
might fail me. but the plant-watering example indicates that swinburne 
is mistaken: trust does not require evidence that the trustee might fail. 
similarly, a small child is perfectly confident that her father will catch her 
at the bottom of the slide; this example is arguably paradigmatic of trust. 
All that trust requires is putting oneself in a  position of vulnerability 
vis-à-vis the trustee (baier 1995: 152): however remote the possibility in 
which the trustee fails, his failing would have negative consequences for 
you simply because, by trusting, you place yourself in his power.
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How, then, can it be instrumentally rational to act in trust in spite 
of having low evidence-proportioned confidence that the person is 
trustworthy? In one of two sorts of situation. In the first, call it a desperate 
leap, one values something enough to risk a great deal to obtain it, the 
only acceptable way to obtain it is to trust someone, and that person’s 
coming through is a long shot on one’s evidence. For example, I am far 
from confident that the masked stranger will hoist me up, but I value my 
life and if I refuse his hand I’ll plummet to certain death. or if one values 
something enough which only God can provide, such as eternal bliss, 
but lacks evidence that God is trustworthy (perhaps because, on one’s 
evidence, he is unlikely to exist), it might still be instrumentally rational 
to trust him (say, by acting as if he exists).
The second sort of situation in which an act of trust may be instru-
mentally rational in spite of a  lack of evidence about trustworthiness 
arises when one’s goal is something other than obtaining the thing for 
which one trusts. let’s call this ‘alternate-goal trust’. I could trust Grim 
with my plants for some other reason than that I care about my plants: to 
give him the opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness, to teach him 
about responsibility, or even to encourage him to become trustworthy.24 
When trust is instrumentally rational vis-à-vis a different goal than that 
of obtaining the thing one is trusting for, trusting might be the most 
instrumentally rational action even though one’s evidence suggests that 
the trustee is untrustworthy.
I have argued that acts of trust are better, ceteris paribus, when they 
correspond with evidence-proportioned beliefs about trustworthiness, 
with the possible exception of desperate leaps and alternate goals. This 
might seem odd, making trust appear merely instrumental, which would 
be a  pity since relationship (of which trust is a  good-making feature) 
should not be about furthering one’s ends. This objection is overhasty. 
one’s goals need not be self-interested; they might instead promote the 
good of others or of the relationship itself. one’s goal in trusting God, 
for example, may be to acquire eternal bliss, whatever is right for one, or 
localized needs or favours. Indeed, having such goals, and trusting God 
for their fulfilment, is partly constitutive of relationship with him – as 
when a child trusts her father for her needs. such trust can strengthen 
the relationship. Trusting God, then, is instrumental for cultivating one’s 
relationship with him, which is faith in a nutshell.
24 Horsburgh (1960) calls the latter ‘therapeutic trust’.
74 KATHerINe DormANDY
What about the exceptions of desperate leaps and alternate goals – do 
they violate religious evidentialism? Are they situations in which one’s 
beliefs about God’s trustworthiness need not be proportioned to one’s 
evidence? No  – on the contrary. Proportioning one’s beliefs to one’s 
evidence is crucial for instrumental rationality, for (scepticism aside) it 
maximizes one’s chances of obtaining one’s ends. If I desperately leap to 
trust God because I value eternal bliss, my confidence that eternal bliss 
is worth the risk, and that it can’t be obtained more easily, had better be 
evidence-proportioned. similarly, if my goal is different from obtaining 
eternal bliss (say it is to disconfirm theism by showing God to be 
untrustworthy), I’d better have evidence-proportioned belief that trusting 
God will come up empty. Thus religious evidentialism is vindicated: 
beliefs about trustworthiness should be evidence-proportioned even 
when one acts, in trust, against that evidence.
love and trust are better (ceteris paribus) when beliefs about love- and 
trustworthiness are evidence-proportioned; and thus so (ceteris paribus) 
is any faith of which they are a component.25
IV. AN ArGumeNT From THe bIble
The arguments from love and trust proceed from premises acceptable to 
religious and secular alike. This section argues for religious evidentialism 
from the Hebrew bible26 and the New Testament. recognition of the 
philosophical value of biblical texts is coming into its own with such 
works as stump’s (2011) and Hazony’s (2012). biblical considerations 
should interest both those who regard these texts as sources of truth, and 
those who don’t but who want to convince those who do to proportion 
their religious beliefs to their evidence.
I  discuss the bible at the textual level, without explicit appeal to 
critical techniques.27 Although, like biblical theologians, I use one book 
or section to interpret others, I  won’t here use the New Testament to 
interpret the Hebrew bible.
25 This does not mean of course that a  relationship is always served by seeking 
more evidence. but the reason (as some of our biblical examples will illustrate) is that 
relationship works on the assumption that the parties already have a  great deal of 
evidence about each other.
26 ‘Hebrew bible’ is a mildly infelicitous term, referring to the texts of the Christian 
old Testament in Hebrew; I use it for lack of a better one.
27 This is mainly due to limited space.
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We’ll examine some biblical examples pertaining to the evidential 
grounding of beliefs; first I’ll support my case by appeal to biblical 
semantics.
’Emuna
In the Hebrew bible, ‘faith’ usually translates ’emuna. ’Emuna derives 
from the verb ’aman, meaning (in its Qal form) ‘to confirm, support, 
uphold, establish’, for example as pillars do when supporting a ceiling.28 
Its participle denotes someone who is ‘confirmed, supported, upheld, 
established’. ’Emuna has what Perry (1953) calls an ‘active’ sense (call 
it ’emunaA) and a  ‘passive’ one (’emunaP). ’EmunaA means ‘trust’ or 
‘obedience’; someone who has it trusts, relies on, or obeys someone or 
something. ’EmunaP means ‘trustworthiness’, ‘firmness’, or ‘reliability’, 
applying to someone or something which, having these qualities, is 
a  suitable object of trust, obedience, or reliance. so the object of faith 
(i.e., of ’emunaA) must be genuinely trustworthy. but more importantly 
for our purposes, the person who has faith must be aware of that object’s 
trustworthiness: ‘[b]iblical faith [’emunaA] is an assurance, a certainty, 
in contrast with modern concepts of faith as something possible, 
hopefully true, but not certain’ (Harris 1980: 116). moses’ leaning his 
arms on Aaron’s and Hur’s29 counts as ’emunaA both because their arms 
will support him and because moses is aware that they will. similarly, 
what makes for faith in God is his reliability and the faithful person’s 
awareness of it.30
However, we are still short of religious evidentialism. The faithful 
person must believe that God is trustworthy and this belief must be 
true, but nothing we have said implies that it must also be evidence-
proportioned. From a  biblical point of view, why suppose that it 
should? examination of the bible shows that instances of faith in God 
typically, and normatively, are accompanied by evidence-proportioned 
beliefs about him. space permits me barely to scratch the surface of 
a few biblical texts, but I hope to make an initial etching for further 
research.
28 e.g. 2 Kings 18:16.
29 exodus 17:12.
30 The Greek correlate of ’emuna is pistis, which has a similar semantic range to ’emuna, 
though space prohibits discussion here; see Kittel and Friedrich 1964-1974.
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Evidence in the Hebrew Bible
At the end of their sojourn in the desert, moses reminds the Israelites that 
the strong beliefs they should have about God (in particular that there is 
no God other than the Lord) are proportioned to their and their fathers’ 
experience of the exodus (Deuteronomy 4:33-35, italics added):31
Did any people ever hear the voice of a god speaking out of the midst of 
the fire, as you have heard, and still live? or has any god ever attempted 
to go and take a nation for himself from the midst of another nation, 
by trials, by signs, by wonders, and by war, by a  mighty hand and an 
outstretched arm, and by great deeds of terror, all of which the Lord 
your God did for you in egypt before your eyes? To you it was shown, 
that you might know that the Lord is God; there is no other besides him.
similarly, in Joshua (3:7-17), God wants the Israelites to ‘know’32 that he 
is with their new leader Joshua as he was with their old leader moses, 
thus giving them as evidence the miracle in which the Jordan stopped 
flowing when the ark was carried into it.
of course, most people’s beliefs about God are not supported by 
evidence derived from such dramatic experiences (a whole book would 
be needed to treat the nature of evidence in the bible); for present 
purposes, such passages show that the bible is concerned with the 
provision of evidence about God so that people may proportion their 
beliefs to it.
Why, one might object, should the norm arising from such cases 
mandate? Why not suppose it is permissive, allowing but not requiring 
beliefs about God to be evidence-proportioned? Perhaps these cases 
document a regularity rather than the meeting of an obligation. Perhaps 
God supplies evidence as a  gracious condescension to timid human 
beings, whereas he might be just as happy, or happier, if we held strong 
beliefs about him without it. This might seem the case with Gideon 
(Judges 6:36-40), who, on the eve of battle, asks God for not just one 
sign but, upon receiving it, a  second, as evidence that God ‘will save 
Israel by my hand, as you have said’ (6:36). Although God graciously 
provides the requested signs, surely Gideon’s plea that God’s ‘anger not 
burn against’ him upon requesting the second sign (6:39) indicates that 
Gideon expects God to disapprove of his epistemic scruples.
31 bible citations come from the english standard Version.
32 We may assume that knowledge includes strong belief which is evidence-
proportioned.
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Gideon is indeed too needy of evidence; but the reason is that he 
already has enough to warrant strong belief. He has the evidence provided 
by the spontaneous combustion of the unleavened cakes, which he 
had received upon request from the angel at his initial commissioning 
(Judges 6:17-18). but even this sign, in God’s eyes, was merely a gracious 
condescension to Gideon’s doubt: God’s first approach to Gideon 
employed what one might consider irrefutable evidence, the promise 
that ‘I  will be with you’ (6:16). That the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob will accompany Gideon, of which Gideon is informed by no less 
than a heavenly messenger of that God, is surely a knock-down reason 
for anyone acquainted with God’s character (and even mildly impressed 
by the angel). Finally, ‘the spirit of the Lord clothed Gideon’ (6:34), 
which we should expect to provide Gideon with significant experiential 
evidence. The evidence with which Gideon is first presented is more 
than sufficient, according to the text, for strong belief in the revealed 
proposition; this is why his request for more is excessive.
The Hebrew bible is replete with references to evidence provision 
but space demands contenting ourselves with this representative taster. 
some apparent counterexamples are discussed later.
Evidence in the New Testament
The New Testament supports religious evidentialism too.
matthew, when narrating Jesus’ healing of the paralytic, writes that 
Jesus claims to perform this miracle to provide evidence that:
(1)  Jesus has authority under God to forgive sins.
After famously instructing the paralytic, ‘Take heart, my son; your sins 
are forgiven’ (matthew 9:2), Jesus says to the scribes, who think him 
blasphemous:
‘Why do you think evil in your hearts? For which is easier, to say, “Your 
sins are forgiven”, or to say, “rise and walk”? but that you may know that 
the son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins’ – he then said to 
the paralytic – ‘rise, pick up your bed and go home.’ And he rose and 
went home.
To provide the scribes with evidence for (1), Jesus performs the lesser 
miracle of healing the paralytic’s physical disability, while stating that his 
aim is to provide evidence.
This story might suggest that Jesus provides evidence as a gracious 
or even scornful condescension to the scribes, whereas the people who 
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brought the paralytic would have believed (1) regardless of evidence. but 
elsewhere in matthew, Jesus himself argues that provision of evidence 
about the Christ is built into Jewish tradition (matthew 11). In doing so 
he provides evidence for two points:
(2)  Jesus is the Christ.
(3)  John the baptist is a true prophet.
As evidence for (2), to convince John’s the baptist’s disciples, Jesus cites 
his own miracles (matthew 11:4-6):
‘Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind receive their sight and 
the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are 
raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them. And blessed 
is the one who is not offended by me.’
Jesus also offers evidence for (3), which confirms Jesus’ claims to be the 
one about whom John prophesies. First, Jesus appeals to his listeners’ 
general knowledge about prophets’ typical characteristics (matthew 
11:7-9):
‘What did you go out into the wilderness to see [when you went out 
to see John the baptist]? A  reed shaken by the wind? What then did 
you go out to see? A man dressed in soft clothing? behold, those who 
wear soft clothing are in kings’ houses. What then did you go out to see? 
A prophet? Yes, I tell you ...’
Not only is John a  true prophet, Jesus says; he is the specific prophet, 
foretold by malachi, who prepares the way for God’s messenger. Hence 
Jesus’ second appeal to evidence for John’s prophet-hood comes in the 
malachi citation (matthew 11:9-11):
‘[John is] more than a prophet. This is he of whom it is written: 
“behold, I send my messenger before your face, 
Who will prepare your way before you”.’
The tradition of witness mattered in ancient Judaic law: No death 
sentence could be passed without evidence of at least two witnesses 
(Deuteronomy 17:6), prophets were witnesses to God’s decrees, and there 
were specific kinds of evidence which would help distinguish true from 
false prophets (Deuteronomy 13:1-3). Far from commanding, expecting, 
or desiring belief regardless of evidence, Jesus not only employs evidence 
to convince people, but in doing so takes himself to follow God-given 
tradition. For Jesus and the Jews of his day, evidence-proportioned 
religious belief is the rule, not the exception.
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A complete biblical case for religious evidentialism would be a book 
unto itself, but I hope the considerations offered here provide a sense of 
what that book might contain. let’s consider some prima facie biblical 
counterexamples to religious evidentialism.
The Call of Abram
The narrative of Abram begins abruptly with God saying, ‘Go from your 
country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will 
show you’, and continues, just as abruptly, ‘so Abram went, as the Lord 
had told him’ (Genesis 12:1-4). let us assume that Abram believes that 
God is trustworthy. one might regard Abram’s unquestioning belief in 
God’s trustworthiness, with apparently no evidence about the Lord who 
sent him, as a counterexample to religious evidentialism. but it makes 
more sense to think that Abram already knew God personally. This 
reading is supported by observing that, in most other biblical passages 
where God first speaks to someone, addressees respond in shock or by 
expecting to die (e.g. Isaiah 6:5; Judges 13:22-23). It is thus highly odd 
that Abram does not even act surprised; a plausible explanation is that he 
already has an established relationship with God, which in turn suggests 
that Abram already has evidence that God is trustworthy. We return to 
the Hebrew bible with a discussion of Job, but for now a few suggested 
counterexamples from the New Testament.
 Doubting Thomas
After Jesus’ crucifixion, Jesus’ disciples tell Thomas, another disciple, that 
Jesus has appeared to them in the flesh. Thomas replies, ‘unless I see in 
[Jesus’] hands the mark of the nails [which fastened him to the cross], 
and place my finger into the mark of the nails, and place my hand into his 
side [which was wounded by a roman spear], I will never believe’ (John 
20:25). When Jesus appears to Thomas and the other disciples eight days 
later, he invites Thomas to touch his wounds, and comments, ‘Have you 
believed because you have seen me? blessed are those who have not seen 
and yet have believed’ (John 21:29).
Is Jesus’ remark a  counterexample to religious evidentialism? our 
discussion of Gideon, who should not have needed more evidence than 
he initially received, shows why it is not. Thomas has accompanied Jesus 
from the start of his ministry and hence is intimately acquainted with 
Jesus’ power. Jesus’ comment is a  rebuke to Thomas not for failing to 
believe against his evidence, but for failing to proportion is belief to the 
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great evidence which he already has. Jesus pronounces blessed those 
who believe without seeing him in the flesh, not those who believe 
against their evidence. Indeed, the very next paragraph makes clear that 
the writer’s purpose in penning the gospel is to provide evidence for 
those who have not seen Jesus as Thomas and he himself33 have (John 
20:30-31):
Jesus did many other signs in the presence of the disciples, which are not 
written in this book; but these are written so that you may believe that 
Jesus is the Christ, the son of God, and that by believing you may have 
life in his name.
Far from contravening religious evidentialism, this passage from John 
endorses it by seeking to provide evidence for those who have not 
physically seen Jesus, and by narrating a Jesus who expects those who 
have seen him to believe on the basis of their acquaintance with him that 
he has risen from the dead.
Hebrews
Hebrews 11:1 famously characterizes faith as ‘the assurance of things 
hoped for, the conviction of things not seen’, seeming to suggest that faith 
constitutively involves belief stronger than one’s evidence warrants. but 
this interpretation is overhasty: this passage does not commend belief on 
insufficient evidence, but rather belief that, if God promises that a future 
(hence ‘unseen’) event will occur, it will occur. The passage assumes that 
those believing in God’s promises already have evidence: namely, the 
believed proposition God is trustworthy.
Trust (which here includes the belief element) in God’s promises 
on the basis of God’s trustworthiness is what the passages immediately 
before and after the much-quoted 11:1 urge. In 10:23 it is on the premise 
that God is trustworthy  – which readers are apparently assumed to 
believe – that the writer exhorts both the action and the belief elements 
of trust in God: ‘let us hold fast the confession of our hope without 
wavering, for he who promised is faithful.’ similarly, the list of the 
faithful immediately following 11:1 commends those who, in proportion 
to their beliefs about God’s trustworthiness, believed that his promises 
would obtain. sarah ‘considered him faithful who had promised’ that she 
would conceive a child (11:11); Abram believed God’s promise of many 
descendants strongly enough to offer his son Isaac in sacrifice, because 
33 John 21:24.
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he ‘considered that God was able even to raise him from the dead, from 
which, figuratively speaking, he did receive him back’ (11:19). The ‘cloud 
of witnesses’ (12:1), says the writer, believe that God’s promises will 
obtain because they proportion this belief to their evidence, the believed 
proposition God is trustworthy.
but what about that proposition itself? since this part of Hebrews 
is not concerned primarily with epistemology, it does not say explicitly 
whether the characters’ belief in this evidence is or should itself be 
evidence-proportioned, or whether readers’ belief in it should be. but 
evidence-proportioning is nonetheless implicitly on the agenda. Note 
first that the witnesses named, including Gideon (11:32) (who we saw 
had ample evidence), were aware of who God was, and that most were 
personally acquainted with him, when they acted on their beliefs that 
his promise would obtain. The passage thus seems to assume that the 
characters’ belief in God’s trustworthiness is proportioned to their 
evidence. second, the writer employs the list of witnesses as evidence 
that readers should themselves believe and act on God’s promises: ‘since 
we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us also ... run with 
endurance the race that is set before us’ (12:1). Finally, the passage calls 
readers to look ‘to Jesus, the founder and perfecter of our faith, who for 
the joy that was set before him endured the cross ...and is seated at the 
right hand of the throne of God’ (12:2). If Jesus’ faith is perfect, as the 
writer says, then perfect faith is accompanied by evidence-proportioned 
belief. For Jesus, being God’s son, knew God more intimately than anyone 
and hence had ample evidence for his belief that God is trustworthy.
Far from showing that faith is somehow better without sufficient 
evidence about its object, this Hebrews passage expects beliefs associated 
with faith in God to be proportioned to one’s evidence about God.
Job
some might take the book of Job as a  counterexample to religious 
evidentialism. Job, a  righteous man, suddenly and traumatically loses 
his possessions, his children, and his health, yet refuses (rightly, it turns 
out), in spite of his companions’ urging, to affirm that he deserves it. 
Instead he demands that God explain himself. Finally God does speak 
(out of a whirlwind), beginning with, ‘Where were you when I laid the 
foundation of the earth?’ (Job 38:4) and ending with, ‘shall a faultfinder 
contend with the Almighty? He who argues with God, let him answer it’ 
(40:2). Job answers, ‘behold, I am of small account; what shall I answer 
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you? I  lay my hand on my mouth. I have spoken once, and I will not 
answer; twice, but I  will proceed no further’ (40:4-5). This narrative 
would seem to regard it as inappropriate or even sinful to expect to 
have evidence in proportion to one’s confident belief in God’s goodness, 
justice, and so forth.34
I don’t think that the book of Job contravenes religious evidentialism. 
let’s examine the narrative from an epistemological standpoint.35 Job’s 
innocent suffering provides him with evidence that God is unjust. The 
epistemological content of Job’s communication to God36 is, ‘How can you 
be just when so much evidence indicates that you aren’t?’37 Job demands 
that God explain the incongruity between his supposed justice and the 
present counterevidence, in a way that provides evidence in proportion 
to the belief that God is just. The objection to religious evidentialism 
supposes that God has not done this and that he expects Job to believe, 
against this counterevidence,38 that he is just.
but the narrative, on closer examination, does not support this 
interpretation. let’s look at God’s response to Job, which arguably does 
four things. First, by appealing to God’s knowledge of and sovereignty 
over creation, God’s words provide Job with evidence for the proposition 
There is much additional evidence for God’s justice, pertaining to the setup 
of the universe as a whole, which Job, being human, does not have (and 
perhaps is not capable of understanding).39 If Job knew what God knows, 
we may take the text to suggest, Job would not doubt God’s justice.
second, at least some of God’s words may, if we accept stump’s 
reading,40 provide evidence that God cares for creation as a parent and 
hence that he cares for Job in this way, which is in turn evidence that 
Job’s suffering will somehow be redeemed for Job’s benefit, which would 
render God just. For example, stump calls our attention to an analogy 
34 Thanks to sebastian Gäb.
35 see stump 2011 for a much more wide-ranging discussion of Job than space allows 
here.
36 Job also conveys many non-epistemological communications, including hurt, 
betrayal, anger, and confusion.
37 Job might also be thought to impugn God’s goodness and love; for space we’ll focus 
on justice.
38 let’s assume for argument’s sake that Job has no other evidence which contravenes 
the evidence of his suffering and which supports God’s justice, even though the text is 
not clear on this.
39 Job 38:4-40:2, 40:9-34.
40 2010, Chapter 9.
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which God draws between the sea and a new-born child of God’s: ‘Who 
shut in the sea with doors when it burst out from the womb, when I made 
clouds its garment and thick darkness its swaddling band’ (38:8-9); and 
to God’s use of parental language to refer to his relationship with rain, 
ice, and frost (38:28-29); and so forth.41
Third, God’s response provides evidence arising from an experiential 
encounter with God himself, in which Job (we can imagine) not only 
perceives God’s splendour but also becomes personally acquainted with 
God’s care and just intentions (ibid.).
Fourth, that the creator of the universe holds such a lengthy discourse 
with a human being at all – a rare event in the Hebrew bible, reserved 
for prophets and God’s closest servants – provides evidence. Although 
God’s response does not provide an explanation in the sense of a theory 
explaining Job’s specific suffering, we may suppose that God’s words and 
his presence provide evidence that God is just generally: the judge has 
descended from on high to address the rightly aggrieved.
Thus, rather than high-handedly commanding belief in his justice out 
of proportion with Job’s evidence, God has provided Job with evidence 
for his justice – in spite of not explaining Job’s specific suffering. That this 
evidence satisfies Job (42:1-6) indicates that both Job and the text take it 
to suffice epistemically for confident belief that God is just.
Thus the book of Job (at least on this reading) is consistent with 
religious evidentialism. but it may also be consistent with its negation: 
For all we have said, God’s provision of evidence may be merely a gracious 
condescension to Job’s emotional turmoil, whereas God may prefer that 
Job believe without it. However, the narrative actively supports the claim 
that religious belief should be evidence-proportioned. To see this, note 
that God affirms all that his ‘servant Job’ has said about him (42:7). This 
includes – remarkably – Job’s rebuke to his companions for defending 
God to Job in the face of the counterevidence of Job’s suffering. surely, 
Job has said, God – assuming he is just – will frown on such partiality 
(13:7  ... 10): ‘Will you speak falsely for God and speak deceitfully for 
him? ... Will you plead the case for God? He will surely rebuke you if in 
secret you show partiality.’ Job’s companions advocate belief, against their 
and Job’s evidence, that God is just, whereas Job says that such fawning, 
counter-evidential belief would displease God. Thus God, in affirming 
all that Job has said about him, sides with Job. From the arguments from 
41 see stump, ibid., for discussion.
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love and trust, this should not surprise us: God is more pleased with 
a faith born of evidence-proportioned belief than one born of self-deceit 
or partiality.
To this interpretation one might object: why, if not because of his 
desire for an evidence-providing explanation, does God reprove Job 
so emphatically (‘Who is this that darkens counsel by words without 
knowledge? Dress for action like a  man;  I  will question you, and you 
make it known to me’, 38:2-3), and what does Job so thoroughly repent 
of (‘therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes’, 42:6)? stump 
addresses this puzzle (ibid.) by suggesting that God’s aggressive reproof 
of Job is intended to shake Job into perceiving God’s care for him in 
a way that tenderness might not, and hence that Job, when seeing this, 
repents of not seeing it. What he does not repent of, I suggest, is taking 
the evidence of his suffering to disconfirm God’s justice; rather, he 
repents in acknowledgement of the new evidence he has received from 
his dramatic encounter with God himself. Not only is the book of Job 
no counterexample to religious evidentialism, at least on this reading it 
supports it.
I  have not addressed all of the potential biblical counterexamples 
to religious evidentialism, but I  hope that what I  have said provides 
a flavour of the way in which they might be answered.
V. CoNClusIoN
religious evidentialism shoulders what some might fear is a  heavy 
burden, saying that faithful religious believers need not merely believe 
religious propositions, but that they must do so in proportion to their 
evidence. surely this is too hard a requirement for many; is not belief 
enough, evidence-proportioned or otherwise? As for Job, the problem 
of suffering alone may seem insurmountable. It is not for me to say what 
non-evidence-proportioned belief would be enough for. Perhaps, in 
a  world in which this epistemic ‘ought’ is hard to fulfil, other ‘oughts’ 
overrule it – I don’t know. I have argued only that evidence-proportioned 
religious belief is a feature of ideal faith.
What is clear from religious evidentialism is that it is the believer’s 
business to provide herself with enough evidence to sustain evidence-
proportioned belief about the object of her faith. she may busy herself 
with arguments for and against the existence of God, but she may also do 
her best to gain evidence-providing personal acquaintance of him. This 
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will likely involve confronting, among other hard issues, the problem 
of suffering. What she arguably may not do is fill her evidential arsenal 
with ‘pro’ evidence and avoid any sources which she has reason to believe 
provide ‘contra’ evidence. For evidence of ‘contra’ evidence is, itself, 
evidence. If she comes out the other side of evidential questions about 
God’s existence and character, her faith, like Job’s, will be the best it can 
be. If she does not, she has at least refused to imitate Job’s companions – 
whom God rebukes – in their self-deceptive epistemic partiality.42
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